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1. Continuity or change ?
The completion of the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty (from now on the 
Treaty) in November and its entry into force on 1 December 2009 marked 
the end of an extraordinary and unprecedented lengthy process of 
institutional change of the European Union. The Treaty had been signed on 
13 December 2007, almost two years before its entry into force, by no 
means an excessive duration compared to the ratification of previous 
modifications of the Treaties.  
But the Treaty – in strictly legal terms a substantial set of amendments to 
two previous treaties renamed in the process – has a long history. Initial 
proposals for institutional reform date back to the German reunification in 
1989-1990. They went through lengthy debates that eventually led to the 
European Convention and the 'Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for 
Europe' of 20031 and from there to the 'Treaty establishing a Constitution 
for Europe' of 20042. If the current form of the Treaty is a clear 
consequence of the difficulties of the ratification process of the 
Constitution, the ideas that provide the substance can be traced back to the 
final years of the past century. The pages that follow are not a legal analysis 
but an attempt to identify changes and to assess their significance3.
The Treaty introduces changes in the decision-making process and the 
institutional set-up, but, prima facie, few innovations. Most of the changes 
in the decision-making process take the form of extensions of existing 
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2procedures as, for example, more qualified majority voting in the Council 
and the extension of the areas to which co-decision applies. On the 
institutional setting, the changes are more visible, but not necessarily major 
innovations. The Treaty creates a "stable" (for two and half years, 
renewable once) President of the European Council and a High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy who is at 
the same time Vice President of the Commission responsible for external 
relations (from now on HR/VP). But there has already been a President of 
the European Council, as well as a High Representative and a Commissioner 
in charge of external relations. Changes in the length of a mandate and 
amalgamations and redistributions of competences are not, by themselves, 
radical changes. So, on the face of it, it could be argued that change is 
limited and that, on paper, the traditional institutional triangle is preserved. 
Covered by this appearance of continuity, changes are much more 
profound for two reasons. The first is simply the change in character of the 
two new functions in terms of role, mandate, responsibilities and 
resources. The second reason is that political actors adapt their behaviour 
to the changes of the institutional set-up in which they operate. The 
introduction of new players is clearly a change than affects inter-
institutional dynamics. 
The sociology of organisations tells us that when this type of changes occur 
in a given setting, the new actors try to grasp as much power, competences 
and resources as they can and the older actors try to secure what ever they 
have and tend to minimise and resist change.
2. The decision making process: continuity within change
For years, a common feature of the debate on European integration 
included a more or less elaborated reference to the "democratic deficit", a 
concept as frequently used as poorly defined. At the risk of caricature, it 
can be said that in the debate on the Treaty all stakeholders wanted more 
democracy, which, in their view, meant more say for themselves. The 
Treaty pays tribute to most of these demands, but, at the end of the day, it 
is written by the governments, supported by careful administrations not 
prone to incur in undue risks.
32.1. The ordinary legislative procedure
Ordinary legislative procedure, this is the new name of the co-decision 
procedure which in essence remains largely unchanged. Under this mildly 
mysterious name lies a rather classical legislative navette procedure applied 
in bi-cameral parliaments, which is the 'travel' of a legislative proposal from 
one Chamber to the other, with a procedural mechanism aimed at reducing 
and overcoming divergences. In the case of co-decision this means two 
readings and, if disagreement persists, the holding of a conciliation 
committee, where the European Parliament (from now on the Parliament) 
and the Council sit on par. 
If this becomes the general procedure, the Treaty secures a number of 
exceptions under the form of "special procedures". According to some early 
assessments, some 22 areas are affected, mainly in the foreign affairs and 
security fields4, leading some observers to wonder if the "pillar" structure 
of the previous Treaty, that is the differentiation between "community" 
areas (mainly policies related to the customs union and the internal 
market) and the more intergovernmental ones (foreign policy, home 
affairs) are not still very much present5.
Beyond the pending legislation affected by the transitional arrangement6, 
how meaningful are these changes for the future? As a procedure, co-
decision has been in place since the Maastricht Treaty that is for some 
eighteen years7. We can therefore identify some trends. 
The first one is a reduction in the number of legislative acts considered 
under the co-decision procedure despite the extension of the policy areas 
to which this procedure is applied. From May 1999 to April 2004, some 400 
texts where considered (average of 6.5 a month), but from May 2004 to 
December 2007, only some 220 where submitted to this procedure 
(average of 5 a month)8.  According to sources in the Parliament, had the 
Lisbon Treaty been in force in the period 2004-2007, the number of 
legislatives acts considered under co-decision would have increased from 
around 300 to some 5009. This seems to be based on a rather extensive 
interpretation of the letter of the Treaty.
4It is difficult to predict the future volume of legislation and therefore the 
significance of the extension of the areas in which co-decision is applied. 
Nevertheless, it must be noted that, following the completion of the 
internal market, the main areas of legislation have been new areas, in 
which national legislation where few and in which the national dimension 
was clearly felt as insufficient, notably environment. Then, events provide 
the needed impetus. Justice and home affairs legislation, after being 
blocked for years, benefited from a revival of interest in the aftermaths of 
the September 2001 terrorist attacks. There are no reasons why this should 
not continue. In the future, there will also be need to revisit current 
legislation and tidy it up due, mainly, to technological developments, but 
major increases in size are not likely, except if new needs emerge, as for 
example in the financial sector.
The second trend is a clear tendency by the Parliament and the Council to 
reach an agreement during the first reading: in the period 1999-2004, less 
than 30 per cent of legislative proposals where agreed on the first reading; 
in the period 2004-2007, the figure was more than 60 per cent10. This 
means also that more time is needed, as an average, for the first reading in 
order to reach agreement. Negotiating at this early stage has the added 
bonus of not being subjected to a deadline, which exist at a latter stage of 
the procedure. Finally, some observers consider that this trend of early, 
more political than technical agreements between the Parliament and the 
Council, weakens the role of the Commission in the process11. 
As the originators of a piece of legislation, the Commission services have 
worked for a substantial amount of time on a given project and have the 
expertise and the technical knowledge related to the text. They will debate 
with the other institutions on the basis of this type of arguments but will be 
hill equipped to use the purely political arguments (opportunity, timing, 
impact on a specific constituency, reaction of the public opinion, etc.) that 
prevails among the members of the Council and the Parliament.  
2.2 The budgetary procedure
5The Treaty simplifies greatly the budgetary procedure, establishing one 
reading in each of the branches of the budgetary authority (Parliament and 
Council), on a proposal from the Commission. If Parliament and Council do 
not come to an agreement, a conciliation committee is convened in order 
to reach a joint position within 21 days. 
Apart from this procedural modification, the Treaty introduces two 
substantive changes. The first is the suppression of the distinction between 
compulsory – mostly agriculture policy expenses – on which the Council 
had the final say, and non compulsory expenses, putting both branches of 
the budgetary authority on an equal footing. The second change is the 
recognition of the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) - the five years 
ceiling of expenses - as a legally binding act to be adopted unanimously by 
the Council after the consent of the majority of the members of the 
Parliament. It remains to be seen what, if any, political effects the inclusion 
of the MFF in the Treaty will have and how the Parliament will play its 
cards.
The Parliament position is that these modifications, in order to be to put 
into practice, require (1) the adoption of the new regulation containing the 
MFF and (2) the adaptation of the Financial Regulation to the new 
principles on how to adopt and implement the budget. As usual, the 
initiative on both texts belongs to the Commission. Furthermore, the 
Parliament wants a revised inter-institutional agreement containing mainly 
rules on the collaboration of the institutions during the annual budgetary 
procedure before the budgetary procedure for 2011 starts. The 
negotiations for the adoption of these new instruments will require several
months and some sort of transitional procedure will be needed to deal with 
the 2011 budgetary procedure. 
At the beginning of March 2010, the Commission adopted three proposals 
to take into account budgetary affairs in the context of the entry into force
of the Lisbon Treaty. The proposals involve: (1) the regulation on the MFF 
for 2007-2013, (2) amendments to the financial regulation applicable to the 
general budget of the European Communities and (3) the inter-institutional 
agreements between the European Parliament, Council and Commission on 
cooperation in budgetary matters. 
6What is clear is that the Parliament will seek to apply the principle of joint 
approval by the two branches of the budgetary authority to all other 
budgetary procedures not specifically mentioned in the Treaty. This 
includes mainly the adoption of amending budgets, whose number the 
Parliament has always considered excessive, and the transfers (moving 
appropriations from one part of the budget to another) irrespective of their 
nature (payments or commitments) and of their amounts. In the past, 
Parliament has used to the full its increasing budgetary powers12. There is 
every reason to expect that the Parliament will use its new prerogatives to 
extend its powers.  
2.3. The extension of qualified-majority voting in the Council
According to Parliament sources, the Treaty expands the number of areas 
in which the Council shall act by a qualified majority (158 cases) and 
reduces the need of unanimous decisions (58 cases). Other sources indicate 
more modest changes. A report by the House of Lords indicates that "The 
number of extensions is somewhere between 40 and 60 depending on 
interpretation" and refers to a statement by the Foreign Secretary to the 
House of Commons on 21 January 2008 indicating that the United Kingdom 
would not be affected by or could opt-out of 16 of these and that another 
14 were “purely procedural”13.
Be that as it may, one needs to consider the circumstance that the Council 
in practice rarely votes. Analysing data from 1994 to 2004, academics 
reached the conclusion that  "Too few of the agreed decisions are 
submitted to explicit and public voting for us to have a secure overview of 
the patterns of decision-influencing, and in the recorded instances of 
contested voting the number are too small to support clear overarching 
assertions"14.
This does not mean than the extension of qualified majority voting is 
useless. The "danger" of being outvoted in the Council is meant to be a 
deterrent for countries which obstruct a decision and make them more 
amenable. The purpose is to put a premium on flexibility and the search for 
a common decision. 
7Bearing that in mind, the impact of the "double majority" (countries and 
population) required in some of the Treaty dispositions appears an almost 
abstract question. Until 2014, on the basis of a transition clause, the voting 
majority requirements will be same as those included in the Nice Treaty, 
which are even more restrictive than the ones of provided by the Lisbon 
Treaty, and the blocking minority will be a mere four member states.
2.4. The delegation of legislative powers 
The Treaty allows the legislator (Parliament and Council) to delegate to the 
Commission the power to adopt non-legislative acts of general application 
to supplement or amend certain non-essential points of a legislative act. 
The two institutions can set the limits and revoke the said delegation of 
powers. These 'delegated acts' may then be opposed by the Council or the 
Parliament if they exceed the scope of the delegation. This new possibility 
of control granted to the Parliament as co-legislator increases its powers.
The previous "comitology" mechanisms allowed member states to discuss 
and oppose measures proposed by the Commission15. A large majority of 
member states fear that the Commission might adopt highly important 
provisions after insufficient consultation and called on the Commission to 
pledge to consult experts when it drafts these provisions as part of 
delegated acts. 
The Commission tried to respond to these concerns and adopted, on 9 
December 2009, a communication on the implementation in which it sets 
out its intention to systematically consult the national authorities' experts 
of all member states which will be required to implement delegated acts 
once they are adopted. Furthermore, the Commission plans to set up an 
early warning system to enable Parliament and Council more effectively to 
plan how they exercise their prerogatives during a period of two months 
(extendable by one month at the request of either Parliament or Council) 
following the adoption of delegated texts. 
There is no enthusiasm in the Council to delegate powers to the 
Commission without a strong supervisory mechanism, which implies the 
8introduction of a committee with almost vetoing power composed by 
representatives of each member state. In fact, the concern to reduce to the 
minimum the need for delegation has lead to an increase of the precision of 
legislative acts reflected in their increased length, especially in co-decision 
procedures16. 
It would not be surprising if the future confirms this tendency: (1) longer 
and more precise texts, and (2) in case of need for a delegation, the 
inclusion in the text of the legislative act itself of a specific and 
cumbersome ad hoc supervisory mechanism clearly incorporating the 
member states and the Parliament. What are the potential effects of this 
on policy making? There is no prima facie evidence that it should affect the 
volume of legislation or make the process more cumbersome and time 
consuming.
2.5. The role of National Parliaments 
The Treaty provides national parliaments with a new role in the defence of 
the principle of subsidiarity. If one third of all national parliaments 
(parliaments are allocated "two points" to cover for the needs of bi-cameral 
parliaments, each chamber getting one) contest within eight weeks after 
adoption of the proposal, the correct application of the subsidiarity 
principle, the Commission will be obliged to review its legislative proposal 
and decide to maintain, amend or withdraw it. If more than half of national 
parliaments challenge a legislative proposal subject to co-decision under 
the subsidiarity principle and the Commission nevertheless decides to 
maintain its proposal, it will need to explain its motives. The Council and 
the Parliament will have the final say. 
This appears, at first glance, as a kind of fake novelty. The Council, that is 
the governments of the member states, are co-legislators with the 
Parliament. Governments are under the control of their national 
parliaments. Parliaments are, in most cases at least, as some variations can 
be identified depending on the national institutional set-ups, in a position 
to control the position expressed by their governments in the Council if 
they are willing to do so. The most impressive example in that field being 
the Danish parliament which obliges its ministers to place "parliamentary 
9reservations" on final decisions by the Council until it has been consulted, 
although with an ad hoc and light procedure.
But what the Treaty clearly does is to provide a potentially interesting 
incentive for national parliaments to work together and react together if 
something they consider disturbing emerges in the initial phases of the 
European legislative procedure. If the mechanism is used, it may lead to 
more transnational policy debates. It provides also a formalised channel to 
make there voice heard directly as parliaments and not only through their 
national governments. 
2.6. The citizen's initiative
The Treaty also introduces the European citizen's initiative. One million 
citizens from a significant number of member states may invite the 
Commission, within the framework of its powers, to submit a proposal on 
matters where citizens consider that a legal act of the Union is required for 
the purpose of implementing the Treaty.  
The Commission launched a consultation ("green paper") on the issue on 11 
November 2009, before shaping the future regulation. This move was 
welcomed by the European Council in its conclusion of 11 December 2009, 
inviting the Commission to present a legislative proposal as soon as 
possible, with a view to its adoption within the first half of 2010. 
Many issues need to be clarified17, and some were at an informal meeting 
of European Affairs ministers on 13 January 2010, the consensus being that 
signatures should come from one third of the member states, that is nine in 
an EU 27. Ministers also discussed mechanisms to check the authenticity of 
signatures, the process for ascertaining the procedure's admissibility, and 
possible safeguards designed to counter attempts to abuse the citizens' 
initiative by harnessing it for means contrary to the Union's values.
The introduction of such a provision is surprising as it gives the impression 
that the Commission does not listen to its environment. In practical terms, 
the collection of a million signatures in nine states requires logistical 
capabilities that, for the time being, only organized interest or causes can 
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mobilize such as political parties, trade unions, important NGOs. All these 
organisations have access, not to say links, to the Commission, the Council 
and the Parliament. It would be difficult for the Commission to ignore a 
request backed by important organisations and supported by a large number
of signatures.  
The implementation of this new right will be handled with extreme care due 
to its potential political sensitivity. It is more than likely that some sort of 
pre-launching acceptability clause will be introduced otherwise it would be 
an open door to demagogic petitions. A clear reminder of the competences 
of the Commission and more generally of the European Union may avoid the 
launching of initiatives on which they have no say, such as the banning of the 
construction of minarets or a single seat for the Parliament.
Only time, that is the experience acquired in dealing with the first initiatives, 
will provide answers to many questions such as the right degree of precision 
of the criteria for the acceptability of a proposal, the solidity of the support 
of national administrations in the verification of the signatures, the means to 
resolve contradictory initiatives and a long etcetera.
3. The institutional set-up: change within continuity
Any institutional setting is a system in which the modification of the role and 
attributions of one of the actors affects the role and performance of the 
other actors. This is even truer when new actors are introduced into the 
system and that is exactly what the Treaty does. The following lines 
concentrate on the two new main actors and the institution that, on paper, 
gains the most from the modifications that is the European Parliament. The 
role of the Commission hardly changes and the modifications of its 
functioning are more the consequence of the reinforced role, de jure and de 
facto, of its President, following previous treaty changes and the 
consequences of the last enlargement. As such, they are not a consequence 
of the new Treaty. A significant change provided by the Lisbon Treaty would 
have been the reduction of the size of the Commission18. But, in the 
framework of the so called Irish guarantees, there is a political agreement to 
stick to the current situation19.
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3.1. Changes in the Council
Up till Lisbon, in the system of the rotating presidency, a single national 
administration ensured the chairmanship of the working parties 
(preparatory bodies) in the Council, the chairmanship of the different 
formations of the Council and the presidency of the European Council. In 
other words, a clear political hierarchy and reporting line was ensured 
across the set-up, a common language and administrative culture was 
present. Civil servants behaved because they reported to their minister and 
ministers were careful because their head of government was exposed. It 
was also a way of securing some sense of "ownership" of the institution by 
the member states20. 
The shortcomings of the system were known, mainly: (1) six months is a 
very short period of time to ensure continuity and see processes going 
through, (2) the disparity in experience, size and means of the member 
states leads to extremely varied types of presidencies, (3) the loss of any 
previous experience after the largest enlargement. In a Union of 15 states, 
each had the presidency every 7/8 years; now it would take 14 years for a 
state to come back to the presidency.
The Treaty clearly makes the choice of continuity in office against 
commonality of line of command. In doing that, it limits the role of the 
rotating presidency to essential technical work with a political component: 
chairmanship of the Council configuration except Foreign Affairs, of the 
COREPER and of most of the working groups of the Council. What it fails to 
provided is a visible role to the head of state or government holding the 
rotating presidency. 
The newly-appointed European Council President, the former prime 
minister of Belgium, Herman Van Rompuy, outlined his initials views on his 
mandate in a number of public appearances21. On this basis, it is possible to 
conclude that the he will try to drive the calendar of meetings – that is their 
frequency –, the agenda, the attendance through specific invitations and, 
probably more importantly, the conclusions of the meetings.
The Foreign and European affairs ministers would like to play an important 
role in the preparation and follow-up of European Council meetings 
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through the General Affairs Council (GAC). The Treaty stipulates that the 
GAC ensures that the different Council groupings' work is coherent, 
prepares the European Council meetings and ensures that follow-up is 
provided for them, in liaison with the President of the European Council 
and the President of the Commission. The modalities of this coordination 
are still open, but they will take the form of more or less formalised 
contacts with the rotating presidency and, less frequently, with all the GAC 
members. 
It is nevertheless far from certain that the GAC will be able to fulfil this 
ambition. In a world of easy and instant communications, an increasingly 
large proportion of decisions are made through a set of informal contacts
by the European affairs advisers to the Prime Ministers. Early sings indicate 
that the new President of the European Council is having some success in 
"plugging" his own team in that network.
It seems also pretty clear that the only structure which is present at every 
level of the Council (preparatory bodies, Committee of Permanent 
Representatives, all the Council configurations, European Council) in a 
supportive capacity, that is the Secretariat General of the Council, will see 
its influence increase notably through its support to the President of the 
European Council22.
3.2. From the Secretary General / High Representative (SG/HR) to the 
HR/VP
The complexity of the acronym tells volumes about the difficulties of the 
office.
Much has been said and written about the 'double-hating' but comments 
have frequently missed the fact that the HR/VP is not taking over the 
totality of the functions of the out-going High Representative. In effect, the 
'old HR' was also 'double-hated' and his functions as Secretary General of 
the Council are not passed to the new HR/VP depriving the office of the 
resources and support of the Secretariat General of the Council. 
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Similarly, the role of Vice-President of the Commission does not provide 
very much precision on the extension of the portfolio. The Commission, 
despite the clear reinforcement of the powers of its President in the last 
two Treaties, is still a collective decision-making body. Members of the 
Commission can only act on her behalf in so far as they have a proper and 
explicit delegation of powers of the Commission as a whole. Four other 
members of the Commission hold portfolios that relate to external 
relations: trade, development, enlargement and neighbourhood and 
humanitarian affairs. Furthermore, there is hardly any internal European 
policy without a substantial external projection (environment, migration, 
monetary affairs, agriculture, fisheries, transport, etc.). This will require 
coordination mechanisms that are not yet in place.
Furthermore, the mandate of the HR/VP is not a simple merge of the 
mandates of the former SG/HR with the one of the Commissioner for 
external relations. The chairmanship of the monthly meetings of the 
Foreign Affairs ministers (the Foreign Affairs Council) must be added to the 
previous two mandates, with all what it means in terms of preparations and 
follow-up. Finally, a substantial activity of inter-institutional relations, 
notably with the president of the European Council and the president of 
the Commission, must also be added. By any reasonable standard, the size 
of the task is considerable and it is no surprise that the first problem of the 
HR/VP is diary management. 
The second problem is the lack of functioning administrative machinery and 
the need to build it. This is to be done, not starting from scratch – which 
could have been longer but easier in many ways – but by merging pre-
existing structures of the Council and the Commission secretariats, and 
incorporating staff of the foreign services of the member states, which are 
a rather diverse lot in terms of administrative culture, history, resources, 
etc. 
The Treaty establishes that the HR/VP "shall be assisted by a European 
External Action Service" (from now on EEAS) which organisation and 
functioning shall be established by a decision of the Council acting on a 
proposal from the HR/VP "after consulting the Parliament and after 
obtaining the consent of the Commission". In other words, the structure of 
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the service had to be decided by the member states on a proposal of the 
HR/VP accepted by the Commission and indirectly also by the Parliament. 
In this latter case, the 'consultation' of the Parliament, that is the lowest 
procedure in terms of power, masks the reality. The decision on the 
structure of the new service must incorporate amendments to the financial 
regulations and to the staff regulations and a modification of the current 
budget. On these three issues, the powers of the Parliament are identical to 
the ones of the Council. Getting the agreement of the three institutions will 
indeed be a tall order.
In December 2009, the European Council invited the HR/VP to 'rapidly 
present, on the basis of the Presidency report adopted by the European 
Council on 29 October 2009, the proposal on the organisation and 
functioning of the EEAS with a view to its adoption, together with the 
related legal acts, by the end of April 2010' 
What was produce within this deadline, following a political agreement 
among the member states, was a draft proposal for a Council decision 
establishing the organisation and functioning of the EEAS was made 
public23. It provides some assurances to the Parliament about its future role 
in the external action of the Union and its capacity to scrutinise the activity 
of the service. For the rest, it out lines a substantially autonomous service 
(treated as a separate institution in budget terms), limited to some 1,500 
officers in Head Quarters and 2 to 3 per embassy abroad that is some 400 
more, at least a third of them being diplomats on temporary loan (4 to 8 
years) from the national foreign services, the rest being Commission or 
Council secretariat civil servants. This means that the vast majority of the 
European Union civil servants and other agents posted abroad will not be
members of the EEAS (basically all specialised attachés –trade, financial, 
development, etc. - will remain officers of the Commission). The draft does 
not clarify the essential questions of the much needed deputies for the HR / 
VP. In terms of organisational structures, it keeps basically unchanged the 
Council secretariat structure dealing with crisis management, and for the 
rest ops for a rather classical division in geographical areas and support 
functions. Initial reactions to the process and the initial results have lacked 
lukewarm24.
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The EEAS will be in place at the earliest at the end of 2010, but it will take 
more time to operate in full. It is therefore meaning full to consider some of 
the decisions already take. 
The business of all configurations of the Council is prepared by a number of 
preparatory bodies (working groups), chaired by a representative of the 
country holding the rotating presidency. As the Treaty establishes that the 
Foreign Affairs Council is to be chaired by the HR/VP, the issue of the 
chairmanship of the 39 preparatory bodies reporting to that specific 
configuration of the Council had to be addressed before the entering into 
force of the Treaty. The Council decision of 30 November 2009 dealt with 
that. In the area of trade and development (including the Trade Policy 
Committee) the 11 preparatory bodies will be chaired by the rotating 
presidency. The 8 bodies with a geographical scope will be chaired by 
representatives of the HR/VP. The situation was more mixed in bodies 
related to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (9 bodies out of 15 to 
be chaired by HR/VP representatives, the others by representatives of the 
rotating presidency) and the area of Common Security and Defence Policy 
(3 out of 5). This distribution of responsibilities generates, by design, some 
coordination problems.
Transitional decisions where take on the statute of the delegations or 
embassies, both to third countries and to international organizations. The 
Commission has some 140 offices abroad, which makes it one of the more 
dense diplomatic networks, only comparable to the ones of the largest 
member states25. Negotiations took place in November and December 2009 
and the hectic pressure of time produced decisions marked by pragmatism: 
the rotating presidency (Spain) would ensure its pre-Lisbon functions in 
some 60 countries, the Commission permanent delegations would take 
over in 47 countries26. 
The situation of the delegations to multilateral organisations was even 
more complex. The international system is still built around nation-states, 
and the European Union is an odd entity in this context27.The establishment 
and full operation of the EEAS will not be sufficient to clarify the situation in 
this area: it will require also a change of legal status of the EU in 
international organisations that is long and difficult negotiations. 
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3.3. The Parliament
The Parliament did what it always does at the beginning of a new 
legislature and in case of Treaty succession: (1) adapt its rules of procedure; 
maximizing in the process its prerogatives, (2) negotiate with the other 
institutions and adopt an 'omnibus' resolution to clarify the situation of all 
pending legislative business notably the pieces affected by a change of legal 
basis in the Treaty. Also as usual, the Parliament wanted to up-date the 
framework agreement governing relations with the Commission in the light 
of the Treaty. To that end, it adopted on the 9 February 2010, a resolution 
setting out the "common principles" of the renewed framework agreement 
between the Commission and the Parliament. Although they have been 
approved by the two parties, these principles must be incorporated into a 
formal document and difficult negotiations on certain points can be 
expected. 
On inter-institutional relations, the position of the Parliament is very 
consistent with the past, as the request can be summarised as follows: (1) a 
beefed-up dialogue through a set of regular meetings between bodies of 
both institutions, (2) the participation of Commissioners, including the 
HR/VP, to 'question hours' in the Parliament, (3) the consultation of the 
Parliament and the organisation of hearings in case of  modification of the 
allocation of portfolios in the Commission, (4) the organisation of hearings 
of candidates to the posts of executive director of European regulatory 
agencies and (5) the consultation of the Parliament on the next review of 
the Code of Conduct for Commissioners. 
When it comes to legislative initiative, the Treaty grants a majority of 
Parliament's Members, to request the Commission to submit proposals on 
matters on which it considers that a Union act is required for the purpose 
of implementing the Treaties. The Parliament would like the inter-
institutional to be specific on deadlines and modalities: response to every 
initiative within three months following adoption, presentation of a 
legislative proposal at the latest one year later or inclusion of the proposal 
in the following year's work programme, detailed reasons in case of refusal 
by the Commission. 
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The Commission is also invited to ensure that the procedure for assessing 
the impact of new legislative proposals is transparent and independent. To 
some in the Parliament this means that the assessment would necessarily 
have to be conducted outside the Commission. Commission sources note 
that the agreed text states that the impact assessment "shall be conducted 
under the responsibility of the Commission" and does not rule out the use 
of external experts. As far as international agreements are concerned, the 
Parliament will press the Commission to provide "immediate and full" 
information on negotiations. This will be particularly significant in the 
negotiations of trade agreements, as the Treaty requires the approval of 
the Parliament. 
Interestingly, the Parliament is the cause of the first amendment to the 
new Treaty. The Parliament was elected in June 2009 under the previous 
Nice Treaty. The June 2009 European Council decided that when the Treaty 
would come into force, 18 extra seats would be added (four for Spain, two 
for Austria, two for France, two for Sweden and one each for the 
Netherlands, Poland, Italy, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Latvia, Malta and the United 
Kingdom). Ten days after the entering into force of the Treaty, the Council 
endorsed the amendment to the Treaty protocol on transition measures for 
the Parliament to temporarily increase the number of Members up to 754 
(until the 2014 European elections, when the number will be reduced to 
751).  An intergovernmental conference will therefore be required to 
amend the Treaty, but the member states would like this to be very brief, 
limited to this issue alone and not preceded by a convention (as provided 
for by the Treaty). A majority of the Parliament seems to agree. 
This limited increase will not affect the political balance in the Parliament, 
but may have some impact on the balance of power inside the 
parliamentary groups, where the allocation of positions and the distribution 
of relevant parliamentary work, follows numerical strength. 
What are the potential effects of the increase of the Parliament's powers 
on its future relationship with the Commission? In a difficult adjustment 
period, with the introduction of a more visible intergovernmental 
institution as the European Council, the interest of the Parliament is to 
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support the institution on which its influence is the greater, that is to 
support the Commission.
4. Change or continuity?
For some, the Treaty and its implementation suffer from a timing error. 
Basically, it was intended to deal with the consequences of enlargement on 
the size of the institutions and the decision making process, attend to some 
tiding-up needs in the form of simplification and boast the standing of the 
European Union on the world stage in a context of increased globalisation. 
Paradoxically perhaps, the previous institutional structure proved to be 
more resilient to the stress of the extension than initially foreseen, notably 
due to the efforts of the Commission and the Parliament. The real challenge 
was the initial financial crisis and its consequences. In purely institutional 
terms, the Treaty offered pretty little help to deal with the situation. But 
the European Union is something more than an institutional set-up; it is 
also a dense and complex net of social and political links, habits of working 
together, methods and capacity to mobilise expertise. These proved 
invaluable in addressing the problems as they unfolded. 
Inevitable, comments and analysis of the Treaty have concentrated on 
changes and innovations. As a counterpoint, it is worth recording what 
seem to be some persisting elements.
The first is that institutional change is not over. The European Council 
meeting conclusions of 11 December 2009 stated that "The Treaty provides 
the Union with a stable and lasting institutional framework and will allow the 
Union to fully concentrate on addressing the challenges ahead". This seems 
to reflect a comprehensible institutional reform fatigue. Admittedly, the last 
institutional change has been record long, difficult and, as usual, has left the 
participants and promoters without any discernable political benefits. On the 
contrary, political costs have been high in some cases. No wonder they say 
'no more'. So, the general consensus seems to be that no institutional reform 
will take place in the foreseeable future. 
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This view tends to underestimate the fact that institutional reforms have 
always been a consequence of necessity. The Treaty is not a complete and 
closed document. For a start, its implementation will be progressive, for 
example on the modalities of qualified-majority voting. It has also some 
built-in flexibility as the clauses paserelles demonstrates. But, more than 
anything else, the Treaty does not provide all the details needed for its full 
implementation. A substantial number of provisions need to be developed, 
among other means through inter-institutional agreements, and others will 
evolve through practice, notably the EEAS. More important perhaps is the 
fact that, in the course of the ratification process, some political 
commitments where made to Ireland, the Czech Republic and Poland that 
will have consequences in terms of Treaty amendments.
Taking into account the experience of the past and the challenges ahead, it is 
not adventurous to predict that institutional change will continue. What may 
be different is the formal shape of it. The opening of a comprehensive review 
of the Treaties with grand designs is probably over. But more modest and 
discrete changes will take place. 
The near future will also provide opportunities for further adjustments 
notably through the Accession Treaties of new member states (Croatia, 
Iceland, etc.). The European Union has always been planning or 
implementing an institutional change. Why should this stop when we know 
that the new challenges will need new responses?
Secondly, there is no discernable alternative to the continuation of 
consensus politics. The European Union has always been political, not only 
as a project but also in its functioning. Political affiliation played an 
important part, even if far from exclusive, in the recent high level 
appointments. The association of national political parties in European 
parties contributes very powerfully to the work of the Parliament, but also 
to the shaping of the political landscape in a number of member states 
where the party system has not reached maturity yet. Their role is 
recognised by the Treaties and becomes particularly visible when, for 
example, the heads of state and government meet along party lines before 
each European Council.
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The European political set-up is not a transposition of any of the national 
systems, not even an amalgamation of different elements picked up from 
the member states. It must be recognised as a system on its own28. Hence, 
the frustration and misunderstandings of a number of national political 
actors and observers once confronted with a political system that they are 
unable to read with national lenses.
As the European Union is still an ongoing institutional construction, the 
need for a much larger political support than the one needed in a finalised 
institutional setting will continue for the foreseeable future. In other words, 
it is still too early to envisage the extension to the European level of the 
classical model of adversarial politics which predominates in the larger 
member states: coalition politics along the lines of the smaller member 
states of continental Europe will prevail.
Finally, institutional settings seem to matter more than office holders.
Names have been avoided in these pages because they do not really help to 
understand the situation and predict the institutional evolution. There is no 
denying that the personality and characteristics of office holders do matter 
but, considered from a medium term perspective that is with some distance 
from the media head-lines, they matter less than the hard facts. 
Who ever would have been appointed for one of the new or older offices 
would have faced the difficulties of the current incumbents. It is possible to 
speculate about what would have been the performance of other potential 
office holders. It is true that matters of style and personality may have made 
things more or less visible, but the underlining difficulties of power 
definition, establishment of new practices, search for new inter-institutional 
agreements, etc. would have been the same.
If, as we have seen, transition periods in the case of treaty succession can 
be limited to 'one shot' operations if the institutional and administrative 
tools are in place and need only minimal adjustments mainly to deal with 
on-going business, this is not the case when innovations are more 
substantial in terms of redistribution of powers. One may also add that 
change always faces resistance. Vested interests, some times of a 
conflicting nature, are present all the way long and few coalitions are more 
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effective than conservative ones. The dust of inter-institutional tensions 
will settle, it always does, but it will take some time. 
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